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Editor’s note
Identifying the best route to economic success – past and
future – is one of the themes linking several pieces in this
issue. As our front cover hints, it may be more than just a
matter of finding the right switch to press. The approaching
millennium has focused economists’ minds too, as has the
first anniversary of the new Labour government in Britain.
The Centre for Economic Performance has always concen-
trated on the big issues: this summer CentrePiece reflects
some of the current work examining the changing economic
landscape. 
One of the biggest changes in recent years has been the
spread of job insecurity: even people who have no experi-
ence of unemployment are worried about their working
future as politicians and business leaders talk about the end
of the job for life. Paul Gregg and Jonathan Wadsworth have
been looking at whether this perception is borne out by the
facts: the first results of their new research – you saw it here
first – suggest that the picture is more complicated than the
mantra might imply. 
It’s currently fashionable in political circles to talk about the
third way. Alan Manning offers a controversial contribution to
the debate by asking whether this third way really exists. He
warns of the danger of overlooking policies of proven effec-
tiveness in the quest for a new economic policy. For some
European countries, any economic policy will feature the sin-
gle European currency from next January. Continuing our
analysis of the effects of EMU, Hélène Rey considers what
role the euro will have in the international monetary system –
and, in particular, whether it will pose a challenge to the 
dollar’s supremacy. 
Big ideas do not come much bigger than ensuring the sur-
vival of the planet and in our first, and long overdue, article
on environmental economics, Daniel Sturm looks at last
December’s Kyoto deal: he argues that the controversial
agreement on emissions trading could be a valuable tool for
controlling global warming. Danny Quah, of course, always
thinks big and as he returns to his regular column he sug-
gests that society should embrace the inevitable change
which weightlessness will bring. 
Most of the articles in this issue look forward: but this is also
an appropriate time for reflection. Standing back from the
political disputes, Nicholas Crafts gives his end of term
report on the Conservative class of 1979 to 1997, offering
a measured economic assessment. This makes a neat juxta-
position with our distinguished guest columnist: Ed Balls,
Chancellor Gordon Brown’s Economic Adviser, sets out his
views on developing an effective economic policy for the
future. And Graham Ingham neatly brings all this talk of
change together in his assessment of the implications of
globalisation for governments.
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2for a fight:
On January 1, 1999,
the new European
single currency, the
euro, comes into being.
Much has been written about the
internal operation of monetary
union; but here, Hélène Rey of
the CEP, considers a different
aspect: what role the new
currency will have in the
international monetary system.
Gearing up
A
fter half a century of domination in world
monetary affairs, the dollar is about to face
its stiffest challenge: from a new currency
which does not yet even exist. So far, at any
rate, American policymakers have tended to
be sceptical about the seriousness of any
threat to the dollar; and most consumers on both sides of
the Atlantic probably don’t care. Ordinary Europeans,
indeed, are mainly pre-occupied with the difficulties of
getting used to a new currency. But some European
politicians and economists (especially in France) 
from outside influence or coercion in
formulating and implementing policy. It is
also able to pursue its foreign objectives
with fewer constraints – as well as to
exercise a considerable degree of influence
over others. Examples abound: the unilateral
decision by President Nixon in 1971 to abandon
the postwar monetary system and more recently,
the crucial role played by the US Treasury in the
Mexican debt crisis of 1995.
There are economic gains, too. The issuer of an interna-
tional currency – that is, a currency held in large quantities
by foreigners – can benefit from seigniorage gains (essen-
tially, the profit which governments make by printing
money). Conventional estimates indicate that as much as
50 to 60% of the total US outstanding money stock is
held abroad (the black economy accounts for a lot of
these money holdings). The flow of international seignior-
age to the United States is around 0.1% of US GDP per
year. And there is another, often neglected, source of
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see economic and monetary union (EMU) as the best
hope of undermining the dollar’s hegemony in the interna-
tional monetary system. Are they right? And does it 
matter anyway? 
Up for grabs?
It certainly matters. You don’t have to be an economic histo-
rian to realise that international monetary supremacy confers
substantial political benefits. Just look at America’s postwar
experience. The hegemonic power is always better insulated
the euro, the dollar and the
international monetary system
seigniorage: a liquidity discount on short-term government
debt. The dollar’s status as international currency and the
consequent demand for it, has the effect of reducing the
real yields that the US government has to pay on its debt.
Non-resident holdings of US government securities make
up about 25% of the total stock, compared with 17% of
other government debt. Rough estimates indicate that 
this second source of seigniorage could amount to 
another 0.1% of US GDP. Efficiency gains from the 
extensive use of a currency could be as much again as
seigniorage gains.
None of these numbers are huge – but nor are they negligi-
ble. So a shift in the balance of power in the international
monetary system could mean political and economic gains
for Europe – at the expense of the US. But how likely is a
shift – and if there is one how significant will it be? Richard
Portes (of the LBS and CEPR) and I have developed a new
analytical approach to try to answer these questions.
Until now, international trade flows and official reserve
holdings have been seen as the main determinants of inter-
national currency use and the main way of predicting
changes. It was not until after the Second World War that
the dollar replaced sterling as the main international
currency – long after the shift in relative economic power
between Britain and the US. But in those days, capital 
was much less mobile than it is today. International finan-
cial markets are increasingly inter-connected and
integrated: more than one trillion dollars crosses the
exchanges every day. It seems reasonable to assume that
changes could occur much more quickly nowadays. In our
analysis, therefore, financial market considerations take
centre stage. 
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A shift in the balance of power in the international
monetary system could mean political and economic
gains for Europe – at the expense of the US.
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The expanding euro?
What gives a currency international status? A currency is
a good means of payment if a lot of people use it. The
usefulness of any given currency for financial transactions
and for the denomination of financial assets increases in
line with the number of people using it. When markets are
very liquid (or easy to use), transaction costs are low and
this, in turn, encourages even more people to use them,
an effect known as a network externality. For this reason,
the financial markets using the euro will potentially be
much bigger than all the financial markets in EMU
member countries added together. Moreover, as the euro-
denominated securities markets grow and become more
liquid – with the consequent fall in transaction costs for
people using those markets – euro-denominated assets
will become even more attractive. 
That in turn will expand the use of the euro as a vehicle
currency, that is a currency used as an intermediate stage
in the exchange of two currencies (usually with limited
circulation) which cannot be exchanged directly. There is
an obvious synergy between the use of a currency as a
vehicle in this way and as a currency of denomination for
financial assets. 
In our analysis, the currency in which private invoices are
denominated, the currencies held as central bank and
government reserves and the use of a currency as an
anchor or peg in international exchange rate systems are
all secondary to these financial and foreign exchange
market interactions.
For now the dollar is king
Currently, of course, the dollar is the dominant international
currency however you choose to measure it. Figure 1
shows the denomination of foreign exchange transactions:
the dollar is used in 83% of two-way transactions, with the
next most frequently-traded currency, the deutschemark
only used in 37% of such transactions. Figure 2 shows a
similar picture for the invoicing of world exports. Figure 3
shows that in spite of a decline in the dollar’s share of
official reserves, its position remains dominant. The domes-
tic market in Europe for private bonds is two-thirds of the
American market; total public sector debt in the European
Union countries amounts to two-thirds of that in the US.
The share of the dollar in official reserves, although declin-
ing, is overwhelmingly higher than the share of any other
currency. With the creation of the euro, however, all this
could change.
A glimpse of the future
The euro will come into being on 1 January 1999 with
eleven members*. In due course, though, the euro area is
likely to include all fifteen existing members of the EU,
including the UK, whose membership will be significant
because of the size of London’s financial markets. It will
probably take much longer to integrate the countries of
eastern and central Europe expected to join the EU after
2002. It’s fair to assume that the new European Central
Bank (ECB) will act quickly after next January to establish
its credibility and reputation in the world’s financial markets.
We have constructed a three-region model of the world
(Europe, United States, Asia) to see how the choice of a
vehicle currency is likely to be determined from 1999
onwards and to gauge the demand for financial assets
denominated in different currencies over the medium
term. This model suggests that several different outcomes 
are possible. 
We’ve called the first scenario the quasi status quo. Here,
the euro replaces the dollar as the dominant currency for
exchanges between Europe and the Asian bloc, but the
dollar remains the vehicle currency on the foreign exchange
markets. In our second scenario, the medium euro, the new
currency replaces the dollar as the main international
currency for financial asset transactions; but transactions
between the United States and the Asian bloc are still
dominated by the dollar, and the dollar is still the vehicle
currency on the foreign exchange markets. In our big euro
scenario, the euro also takes on the role of vehicle currency.
Foreign exchange and securities market data show that the
first of these scenarios is most likely in the short term. But if
financial market integration in Europe progresses suffi-
ciently, then the overall size of the European securities
markets could bring transaction costs down to the point
where the fundamentals would support either the medium
euro or the big euro scenario.  The euro may then begin to
usurp some of the dollar’s international roles, although the
extent to which it does this will depend on policy decisions
and on the beliefs of market participants. 
The analysis suggests that if displacement on a large scale
did occur there would be quantitatively significant potential
benefits for the euro area. These could be similar in size to
the international seigniorage benefits currently enjoyed by
the US – and the gains would be partly at the expense of
the US and, to a lesser extent, of the Asian bloc. Adding
together seigniorage and efficiency gains, we reckon that in
an extreme case, if the euro were to replace the dollar
almost entirely – the big euro scenario – the benefits to the
euro economies could be somewhere in the region of 0.3%
to 0.5% of GDP. 
A mixed blessing?
On the face of it, these figures provide strong support for
political leaders keen to promote a significant international
role for the euro. But there are arguments which weigh
against such an approach – and which have in the past led
both the Bundesbank and the Bank of Japan to discourage
the greater international use of their currencies. Being the
world lender of last resort can be a curse rather than a
5
* Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Portugal and Spain.
The share of the dollar in official reserves, although declining, 
is overwhelmingly higher than the share of any other currency. 
With the creation of the euro, however, all this could change.
blessing, as successive American administrations have
discovered. Material gains as well as policy autonomy can
be eroded by the accumulation of an overhang of liquid
foreign liabilities, something British governments realised in
the 1960s and 1970s. Policy can become increasingly
constrained by the need to discourage sudden conversions
into other currencies.
But if the balance is nevertheless judged to favour the inter-
nationalisation of the euro, policymakers should focus their
efforts on integrating European capital markets: increasing
their liquidity, breadth, and depth. For this, both regulatory
policy and various aspects of harmonisation across Europe
would be crucial; so too will private market initiatives
(establishing benchmark interest rates and securities). Any
measure which enhanced the credibility of the European
Central Bank would also be important (though the new
central bankers should bear in mind that credibility does not
always mean engaging in tough monetary policy). 
More than anything, the ECB in its early days needs to
develop its own distinct identity. The board needs to
function in a way which eliminates the suspicion of national
coalitions. The battle between M. Trichet and Mr
Duisenberg to become the ECB’s first President has been
counterproductive by shifting the debate from ability to
competing nationalities. Ensuring proper accountability for
the ECB is also important, to ensure long run political
support for the common currency. An opaque Central Bank
reluctant to explain its monetary policy decisions would be
more likely to become a scapegoat for European public
opinion if the euro area were to experience a serious
economic downturn in the future. This could help
strengthen the anti-European sentiment still prevalent in
some EU members. 
Potential instability
Whatever happens in the long run, the dollar is certain to
remain quantitatively dominant for some considerable time.
The speed of change in the global economy may be far
greater than in even the recent past: but lags are inevitable,
as are uncertainty and simple inertia. Indeed, the early
years of monetary union could see considerable instability
associated with the emergence of the euro on the interna-
tional scene. The European authorities will have to take
account of this potential instability and the inevitable
exchange-rate pressures in setting monetary policy. This
may make simple policy rules (like targeting monetary
aggregates) inadvisable, at least in the early years. 
At the same time, improvements in international macroeco-
nomic policy co-ordination may be needed to mitigate the
effects of potentially sizeable portfolio shifts. Smoothing out
the decision-making process within the euro area itself
would be a good place to start. In particular, the respective
powers of the ECB and the various EU ministerial and
official committees will have to be clarified. This is unlikely
to happen until monetary union is up and running, and even
then may take some time judging by some of the recent
quarrels that have plagued Ministerial discussions. All EU
members, whether in EMU or not, will continue to partici-
pate in discussions at ECOFIN (the regular meeting of
finance ministers), and some of these discussions will
involve matters relating to the work of the ECB. But a 
new, quasi-informal group of ministers has also been
created, Euro-11: membership of this group, which has
been set up to keep an eye on how EMU operates, is
restricted to the ‘ins’.
Other outstanding issues which remain to be solved include
the lender of last resort function of the ECB, as well as the
nature of its role in supervising and regulating the banking
system. The EU also has to tackle the contentious issue of
subsidiarity – how in the future should EU countries co-
ordinate their positions in international fora: should the G7
become a G3, for example, or should the EU become a
single member of the IMF? These are all difficult issues and
some at least will be the subject of acrimonious debate.
They are likely to ensure that whatever happens in the
financial markets to erode the dollar’s supremacy once the
euro comes into being, the political benefits of having an
international currency will elude the EU for some time.
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Whatever happens in the financial markets to erode the
dollar’s supremacy once the euro comes 
into being, the political benefits of having an 
international currency will elude the EU for some time.
Hélène Rey is a member of the CEP’s National Economic
Performance Programme. 
The Emergence of the Euro as an International Currency,
Alogoskoufis, Portes and Rey, Discussion Paper 388, May 1998 is
available from the Centre for Economic Performance, price £5.
An opaque Central Bank reluctant to explain its monetary policy decisions
would be more likely to become a scapegoat for European public opinion if the
euro area were to experience a serious economic downturn in the future.
I
f there is one thing the average Briton shares with most
media commentators these days, it’s the certainty that
the job for life is a thing of the past. The conviction that
job insecurity is far worse than ten or twenty years ago is
widespread. Yet some observers see this as a classic
example of public perceptions being out of line with the
facts: they note, for instance, that most of the available data
appears to show little actual change in patterns of job
stability. This is an area where perceptions are particularly 
important – if people feel insecure
about their jobs, it can have a signifi-
cant impact not just on factors such
as work morale, but on the overall
quality of life. The true extent of job
insecurity also has important 
implications for govern-
ment policies in
this area. So
trying to pin
down who’s right
in this debate is a
worthwhile, if 
difficult, exercise.
Job security is a difficult concept to measure. But we can
find a useful proxy in a related concept which is easier to
assess: how long a job is likely to last and whether this
changes over a set time period. Our research has used
both of the major data sources available, that contain infor-
mation on job stability in the UK, to try to get at the facts.
As is so often the case, we discovered a much more
confused picture than the debate might suggest. Job 
stability does appear to be declining for most of
us. But the general ageing of the population (as
people live longer, and have fewer children the
average age of the population rises) coupled with
a significant shift in the employment patterns of
women who’ve had children, has tended to mask 
these underlying trends. There’s an impor-
tant qualification to be made,
however: the scale of the
changes taking place
are relatively small – 
it is not at all clear that
they are substantial
enough to justify public
perceptions.
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End of  
The CEP has long been known for its groundbreaking work on the
operation of labour markets. Here Paul Gregg and Jonathan Wadsworth
report on new research which has been testing the contention that job
insecurity in Britain is much greater than it used to be.
by Paul Gregg and Jonathan Wadsworth
the job for life?
8Total Men Women
Length of current job 1992 1997 1992 1997 1992 1997
Months
1 month 20.5 24.9 20.4 23.8 20.6 26.4
2 months 22.2 21.8 23.9 21.3 20.7 22.4
3 months 16.9 18.8 16.7 18.8 17.2 18.8
4 months 15.8 15.3 15.1 17.7 16.5 12.8
5 months 16.5 15.2 18.2 15.4 15.0 15.0
6 months 14.6 14.8 13.8 13.7 15.2 15.9
12 months 8.7 9.2 6.8 9.5 10.5 8.8
Years
1-2 years 7.8 8.0 6.9 7.7 8.5 8.2
2-3 years 5.8 5.9 5.9 5.6 5.7 6.2
3-4 years 4.4 4.6 4.7 4.5 4.2 4.6
4-5 years 3.5 4.0 3.2 3.5 3.9 4.5
9-10 years 1.9 2.6 1.4 1.8 2.7 3.5
14-15 years 1.8 0.7 2.0 0.8 1.5 0.6
20 years+ 2.4 1.8 2.9 1.3 1.4 2.9
Total 5.5 5.9 4.9 5.6 6.1 6.3
Table 1 Separation rates by job tenure
Age
16-24 25-34 35-49 50+ Total
Total
1985 1yr 7mo 4yr 6mo 7yr 8mo 13yr 1mo 5yr 2mo
1995 1yr 5mo 4yr 4mo 7yr 4mo 10yr 7mo 5yr 6mo
% change 85-95 -10.5 -3.7 -4.3 -19.1 -9.6
Men
1985 1yr 8mo 5yr 5mo 10yr 1mo 15yr 10mo 6yr 8mo
1995 1yr 6mo 4yr 11mo 9yr 2mo 12yr 10mo 6yr 6mo
% change 85-95 -10 -9.2 -9.1 -18.9 -3.7
Women
1985 1yr 5mo 3yr 3mo 5yr 1mo 10yr 1mo 3yr 11mo
1995 1yr 5mo 3yr 8mo 5yr 7mo 9yr 4yr 7mo
% change 85-95 0 12.8 9.8 -10.7 17
Women with dependent children
1985 0yr 11mo 1yr 11mo 4yr 2mo 7yr 11mo 2yr 8mo
1995 1yr 3yr 1mo 4yr 7mo 7yr 1mo 3yr 9mo
% change 85-95 9.1 60.9 10 -10.5 40.6
Women without children
1985 1yr 10mo 4yr 10mo 7yr 11mo 10yr 8mo 5yr 1mo
1995 1yr 7mo 4yr 2mo 7yr 6mo 9yr 3mo 5yr 5mo
% chnage 85-95 -13.6 -13.8 -5.3 -13.3 6.6
Table 2 Median job tenure by age
Source: Labour Force Survey
Source: Labour Force Survey
Job Stability in Britain
The first challenge an 
analysis of this kind has to
face is how to measure job
stability? One way is to
look at new jobs and see
how long they survive. An 
alternative approach is to ask how long
those in work have been with their current
employer. These two approaches come up with
very different results. The typical new job lasts just
15 months, for instance; but the typical worker already
has a job that has lasted 5 years and can expect that
job to last for about 10 years in all before moving on.
This apparent contradiction is easily explained. Most
jobs last for only a short time, but most workers are in
jobs that have lasted for some time already – for longer
than the average job duration, in other words – and the
longer a job has already lasted, the longer it is likely to last
in the future.
Figure 1 takes a cohort of new jobs (those created
between December 1991 and February 1992) and then
every three months asks how many of the jobs are still in
existence. By the summer of 1993, 15 months on from the
start of the exercise, half of those new jobs have already
disappeared. After two years, only a third of the new jobs
are left. But significantly, after 5 years a fifth are still there.
So the rate at which jobs disappear falls sharply over time.
Table 1 gives the proportion of workers who leave their
jobs each quarter, measuring how many months and years
these jobs had lasted. For the first few months of a new
job, about one worker in five will leave their job (for
whatever reason) each quarter. But by the end of the first
year of a job, that figure has fallen to one worker in ten;
after 3 years, only 5% of workers will leave their jobs, and
only 2% will do so after 10 years. 
All this means is that someone taking a new job can on
average expect to stay in it for only 15 months; but that
those who have stayed in a job for 2 years will, on average,
stay with it for another 3 years; and those jobs which have
already lasted 3 years will on average last for 7 years in all.
So although most new jobs have short lifespans, most
people in the current workforce are in jobs which have
lasted beyond the critical initial phase when those new jobs
tend to disappear. In fact, the typical member of the labour
force is in a job which has already lasted for 5 years, and
can expect that job to last for as long again, with the typical
job lasting just over 10 years in all.
But how have things changed?
But this picture is essentially a snapshot of job tenure
today. It does not tell us much about whether patterns of
tenure have changed over time. By using data from the
Labour Force and General Household Surveys we can
analyse changes in job stability over the last 20 years.
Figure 2 plots the estimated
average job tenure for all
workers and by gender. The
key feature is that the cyclical
pattern clearly dominates any
trend – the overall state of the economy is
crucial in determining the average length of time workers
stay in a job. 
It’s perhaps more surprising at first to discover that this
cyclical variation in job tenure appears to run against the
general economic cycle. Average job tenure rises in reces-
sions and falls in good times. The explanation for this is
simple. In a boom, many new jobs are created and so more
workers quit their jobs voluntarily – to take other, better paid
jobs, for example – and this movement reduces the average
length of all jobs. In a recession, there are fewer new jobs
and fewer people voluntarily leave the jobs they have, so
average tenure rises. It’s true that there are more layoffs in
a recession, but these tend to be spread fairly evenly
across all jobs, and so have little impact on the average life
of jobs. 
Table 2 compares the typical job tenure in 1985 and 1995,
similar points on the economic cycle of new job creation
(by measuring vacancies), across age groups and for men
and women with and without children. Average job tenure
has fallen most for those over fifty and least for those aged
between 25 and 34. Job tenure is still higher for older
workers, because more of them are in jobs which have
survived beyond the initial new job shakeout described
earlier; so fewer jobs held by older workers are likely to
disappear. So if the average age of the population rises
then average job tenure will also rise. More older workers
means fewer people leaving their jobs, and thus more
surviving jobs. The average age of the population rose by
two years between 1985 and 1995, so average job tenure
rose as well.
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Figure 1 Disappearence of jobs created between December 1991 and February 1992
Figure 2 Median job tenure, 1975-1997, all
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A different picture for different groups
The picture is rather different for specific groups of
workers. For men and women without dependent children,
job tenure has fallen by around 10% for most age groups.
But job tenure amongst women with dependent age
children has risen rapidly, primarily amongst those aged
between 25 and 34. We believe that this is because the
use of maternity leave has increased sharply over the last
20 years. According to research undertaken at the Policy
Studies Institute, in 1979 just 18% of women working full-
time returned to the same employer after childbirth. This
has now risen to 70%. This means that childbirth no longer
marks the end of a job – and job tenure – for most women. 
These opposing trends, together with an ageing population,
mean that overall job tenure has changed little between
1985 and 1995, and statistical analysis has confirmed this
pattern. Between 1985 and 1997 the proportion of workers
with tenure greater than 10 years fell by 5 percentage
points for men and 4 percentage points for women without
children; but it rose for women with children. These
changes have been concentrated on older workers, but
there is surprisingly little evidence to suggest that these
changes in job stability are affected by the level of educa-
tion. At the opposite end of the scale, more jobs now last
less than a year – which is in line with the overall picture of
a 10% fall in the average life of jobs, apart from those held
by women with dependent children.
An uncertain world
When the figures are examined in detail, the nature of the
changes becomes clear. Much less clear, though, is
whether the size of these changes is large enough to justify
the increasing sense of job insecurity now so prevalent.
Nor is it clear whether the changes described require
specific policy responses from government. There are,
moreover, some uncertainties which remain. We do not yet
know whether we are observing decisions which are largely
voluntary; or whether the changes reflect what the greater 
public unease implies: more layoffs. We do
know that job stability has fallen
furthest among older
workers, and that this group
of workers is that least likely
to leave a job voluntarily. For
this group at least, then, the
end of the belief in a job for life
is something whose
passing is mourned.
Paul Gregg and
Jonathan
Wadsworth are
members of the CEP’s
Human Resources Programme.
ANNUAL CONFERENCE 
6th – 7th July, Lancaster House
The Future of Europe conference, which will be held at Lancaster House 
6th - 7th July, will see the rising generation of political leaders from across Europe
gather to consider some of the key issues which affect them all. 
This event is notable for the fact that MPs attend from east and west Europe and
have the opportunity to meet their contemporaries in an atmosphere which is
devoid of political or national labels. Previous participants at this event have gone
on to assume Ministerial office. This conference aims to equip participants with a
broader understanding of European policy.
The conference will be opened by the Minister for Europe, Doug Henderson, and
will be addressed by a variety of notables in the European policy 
arena. Most important, however, is the atmosphere created by the participants
which helps to further erode the barriers which once divided Europe. 
The conference is organised by the all – party “Future of Europe Trust” which 
is based in the Houses of Parliament. FET arose as an initiative by British MPs to
respond to the changes in the political and economic landscape of 
Europe, both east and west, post 1989. Since which time, both the group and the
work it undertakes have expanded to encompass many areas of European policy. 
For further details on the Future of Europe Trust 
contact: Nick Watts 0171-219 4879. 
FUTURE OF EUROPE TRUST
HOUSE OF COMMONS
LONDON SW1A 0AA
TEL: +44(0)171-219 4879 
FAX:+44(0)171-925 0620
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E
ven with the benefit of hindsight, separating rhetoric
from reality is always difficult when judging
economic performance. Almost every economic
fact is open to subjective interpretation: unlike their
colleagues in the natural sciences, for example, economists
can’t rerun the experiment to see how things would have
turned out in other circumstances; it’s difficult to take
account of the political constraints imposed on policymak-
ers when analysing the economy; and there’s not even any
agreement on which economic policy objectives should
take precedence over others.
Reaching consensus about what the Conservatives did
right and what they did wrong – and even what they had
influence on in the first place – is well-nigh impossible,
therefore. But it is possible to see what happened to the
British economy over the eighteen years of Tory rule and to
make judgements about the link between the policies which
were pursued and the outcome in terms of economic
performance. Though difficult, the exercise is worthwhile:
not just in terms of understanding the past, but – far more
important – because of the guidance it can offer to policy-
makers now.
1979 and all that
When Mrs Thatcher came to power in 1979, her govern-
ment explicitly abandoned the consensus approach to
economic policy which had prevailed pretty much since the
end of the second world war. Keynesianism was repudi-
ated. Full employment and reducing income inequality
were dropped as economic targets and were replaced by
control of inflation and productivity growth. The govern-
ment sought actively to remove the trade unions’ veto on
economic reform. A new emphasis on the supply-side of
the economy was meant to address longstanding
problems of weak productivity and labour market failure. 
These were radical measures, required in the new govern-
ment’s view, by the legacy it had inherited. Britain’s
economic performance had been declining relative to the
other main industrial countries from the 1950s onwards.
Attempts to speed economic growth from the 1960s had
been marked by failure. Vocational training was poor.
Labour was used inefficiently. Bargaining between unions
and management had led to overstaffing, while increasing
wage militancy was augmented by rising unemployment
benefits and rising taxes on labour. Unemployment was
inexorably rising. 
The short term dominated economic policymaking – and
the oil prices shocks of the 1970s, which had led to
stagflation both in Britain and other countries, reinforced
this. Governments of both main parties were intervention-
ist: they believed rising unemployment spelled electoral
disaster, yet they seemed powerless to prevent both this
and rising inflation. Mrs Thatcher inherited an economy so
weak that disengaging from this approach to macroeco-
nomic policy and putting far more emphasis on the supply
side could at best entail short-term pain in return for long-
term gain. But long-term gain crucially depended on
sustaining radical reforms over a long period. There were
no quick fixes.
An end of term report
Eighteen years of Conservative
government in Britain ended with
electoral defeat on an almost
unprecedented scale in May
1997. The Thatcher revolution
was, above all, an economic one,
and the Conservatives left office
claiming that the UK economy
was in better shape than for more
than a generation, a claim hotly
disputed by the Tories’ critics. So
who’s right? Nicholas Crafts of
the CEP stands back from the
political rows to assess the
Conservative record. 
The Conservatives and the British economy
by Nicholas Crafts
13
They promised to fight inflation
Essentially the Tories sought to raise the rate of economic
growth while bringing down both inflation and unemploy-
ment. In their public pronouncements at least, they started
with inflation which remained the central plank of their
economic policy throughout the eighteen years. The aim
was to move right away from demand management: with
the launch of the Medium Term Financial Strategy (MTFS)
in 1980, it was clearly signalled that both fiscal and
monetary adjustments would respond to inflation rather
than unemployment. The immediate implication of the
MTFS was a tightening of policy which precipitated a
severe recession and a big jump in the exchange rate.
But persistent difficulties in the control and interpretation of
monetary targets had led, by 1986, to the adoption of an
informal exchange rate target and then, from 1990-1992, to
membership of the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) with
its explicit commitment to an exchange rate band. Sterling’s
forced exit from the ERM was followed by the adoption of
inflation targets. This was coupled with greater trans-
parency in policy formulation, with the Bank of England
publicly monitoring inflationary pressures. 
During the first two Thatcher terms, from 1979-87, the
reduction in inflation was praised, although the conse-
quences of this process for the real economy were
frequently deplored. But as inflation picked up again in
1988, it became clear that two factors had undermined the
government’s counter-inflationary stance – the persistent
failure to choose suitable policy targets combined with a
reluctance to surrender political control of either monetary
or exchange rate policy.
Neither sterling M3 (£M3), the monetary aggregate chosen
in the early eighties, nor a fixed sterling/deutschemark rate
make attractive nominal anchors; and for policy, both
appear inferior to the inflation targets which were eventu-
ally adopted after 1992. £M3 was unsatisfactory because
it was hard to control and its relationship to inflation 
was often difficult to predict. A fixed exchange rate linked
to the DM proved doubly unhelpful, partly because the
appropriate policy stance differed in Britain and Germany;
and partly because using fiscal policy as a stabiliser
seemed inconsistent with the government’s professed 
aim of setting taxes using microeconomic or supply-
side criteria.
14
It is indeed difficult to believe that an independent central
bank with an inflation target to meet could have presided
over the Lawson boom of 1987-88 and the subsequent
bust. This seems to have been largely an unnecessary and
self-inflicted wound: and the contrast in performance at this
point with New Zealand where the central bank was made
independent with what appear to have been well-designed
incentives is striking.
To promote growth...
With the public rhetoric firmly centred on inflation, the
government had ruled out attempts to improve the
economy’s growth performance by stimulating demand.
Instead, Mrs Thatcher and her government set out to
improve Britain’s poor productivity performance. The thrust
of policy was to strengthen incentives and market disci-
plines rather than to subsidise physical investment. Among
the key elements of the new supply-side policy were privati-
sation and deregulation, the reform of industrial relations,
the restructuring of taxation and restraint on the growth of
public expenditure, a radical revision of vocational training
and the expansion of higher education. Foreign direct
investment was encouraged; rapid de-industrialisation was
accepted in some sectors, and accompanied by a sharp
reduction in subsidies to troubled industries.
In broad terms, this re-orientation of policy had theoretical
support from modern growth economics; it also remedied
earlier mistakes in government economic management in
Britain. Both privatisation, accompanied by a regulatory
structure which permitted price increases below inflation,
and changes in industrial relations, such as the end of the
closed shop and reduced worker bargaining power, could
be seen as raising managers’ incentives to innovate and
raise productivity. Cuts in marginal income tax rates and an
improved supply of human capital (better trained and
educated workers, for instance) can also increase the
rewards for innovative effort.
But in this area of policy, too, there were weaknesses in
implementation. Some of the potential productivity gains
from the privatisation process were foregone because of
failures to introduce competition in areas of monopoly
supply – with British Gas, for instance; and because the
limit on privatised utility price rises – the so-called X factor –
was not sufficiently tight. There was also a broader govern-
ment failure to strengthen anti-trust or competition law.
To reform tax and benefits...
Much was made during the Thatcher years of the govern-
ment’s radical approach to tax cuts and of the importance
of reducing the tax burden to promote growth. But here the
rhetoric diverged significantly from the reality. It’s true that
what had been a rapid rise in government spending as a
proportion of GDP ceased from the mid-1970s on, and by
the 1990s had fallen well behind the big-spending
European countries. The very high marginal income tax
rates were abolished and VAT was increased in the first
Thatcher budget of 1979. But further progress in reducing
the burden of taxation was not pursued with great vigour,
especially in the 1990s.
It was the same story when it came to benefits. In 1980,
the government exhibited considerable courage in ending
the indexing of benefits to earnings and linking them
instead to prices. By the mid-1990s, this implied a saving
of over 3% of GDP, and over £7 billion on pensions alone.
But more radical schemes to restructure welfare were
regarded as politically too difficult – in spite of clear
evidence that benefits like the basic state pension and,
especially, child benefit were very badly targeted at the
poor. An opportunity to improve provision for the seriously
disadvantaged and reduce the burden of taxation at the
same time was passed up.
...and cut unemployment
Right from the beginning, the Conservatives eschewed
Keynesian responses to unemployment. Perhaps the most
famous – and explicit – instance was in the very tight
budget of 1981, when 364 economists publicly indicated
their disapproval. Policy focused on reducing the NAIRU –
the non-accelerating inflation level of unemployment.
Initially, the main leverage was sought by reducing taxes on
labour, weakening trade unions and promoting the reform
of collective bargaining agreements, together with reduc-
tions in benefits relative to wages. In the late 1980s, the
unemployment benefit regulations were tightened signifi-
cantly. From 1986, this was all complemented by increased
attention to reform of education and training which can be
seen as attempting to address structural unemployment by
raising the stock of skills in the labour force.
Empirical research using the NAIRU approach has found
that high unemployment is associated with generous
unemployment benefits which continue indefinitely with little
pressure to take work; widespread coverage of collective
bargaining with no coordination between employers or
unions; high overall taxes; and poor educational standards
at the bottom of the labour market. Well-designed interven-
tions along these lines should therefore have reduced
equilibrium unemployment.
Given the previous Labour government’s experience with
its Social Contract with the trade unions, it is not surprising
that the Conservatives abandoned incomes policies on
taking office, and did not pursue the alternative of seeking
to establish greater coordination in wage bargaining. But
the complementary approach of trying to hide unemploy-
ment by changing the basis on which it was counted, and
by encouraging relocation into categories such as disability
and youth training, was much less commendable. As is
well-known, a fall in the labour force relative to employment
raises wage pressure just as much as a rise in employment
It is indeed difficult to believe that an independent central bank
with an inflation target to meet could have presided over the
Lawson boom of 1987-88 and the subsequent bust.
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relative to the labour force: so the long-run effect of such
measures is to reduce real GDP per person rather than to
reduce the unemployment rate.
Progress on productivity
Perhaps the most striking feature of the period was the
strong upturn in labour productivity growth in manufactur-
ing. This had only a muted impact on the economy as a
whole, however, because it was not accompanied by faster
productivity growth in the services sector. The reforms
introduced therefore appeared to have their greatest impact
on manufacturing, where levels of productivity relative to
leading European countries had fallen back spectacularly in
the previous 30 years. Indeed, as Table 1 below shows,
from 1979 the gap between Britain and other countries
closed significantly, with Britain’s position in 1995 being
generally rather better than in 1973. This was not, however,
the case for marketed services, a sector which accounts
for a larger share of employment in Britain.
Some of the improvement seems to have followed changes
in the bargaining environment and associated developments
in industrial relations. Given the prevailing widespread ineffi-
ciency of labour use, the recessionary shock of the early
1980s, exacerbated by the ill-judged monetary policy of the
time, had a silver lining at least insofar as it precipitated
better productivity through the shake-out of labour and the
change in bargaining power. But that is not to say that
recessions are good for growth: on the contrary, economet-
ric evidence suggests that trend growth in the UK could rise
by more than 0.5% a year if the economy were to enjoy
greater macroeconomic stability in future.
Studies show that product market deregulation and 
privatisation both improved productivity growth in Britain
over the lifetime of the Conservative government. But the
picture on tax and benefits is less clear. There is evidence
to suggest that the reduction in average and marginal
income tax rates can help explain why growth has slowed in
Europe by more than the UK. But this evidence also
suggests that the Conservatives’ failure to make greater
progress in reducing the welfare bill probably had a signifi-
cant cost in terms of growth foregone.
The Tories also failed to make much impact on Britain’s
investment performance. The UK remains behind in terms
of investment as a share of GDP, although its quality has
improved, thanks to the sharp rise in foreign direct invest-
ment into Britain and the decline in investment funds going
to nationalised industries. 
Most difficult to assess, however, is the impact of what
were extensive changes in education and training which
took place during Conservative rule. Both firms and individ-
uals have invested heavily in training – in real terms, expen-
diture in this area trebled between 1971 and 1989. The
proportion of employees who had had some form of train-
ing in the previous four weeks rose from 8.5% in 1984 to
14.4% a decade later. Just under half of 16 year olds
stayed on at school in 1986; ten years later this had risen to
71%. The proportion of managers who were graduates
more than doubled between 1976 and 1986.
But more hasn’t always meant better. There has been much
criticism of the reforms of vocational training and of contin-
ued deficiencies in the school system, especially for the
less able. The rise in the number of vocational qualifications
– from 739,000 in 1990-91 to 912,000 in 1994-95 – has
been at the lower end of the scale. 
1950 1973 1979 1995
Manufacturing
France 90.4 130.6 149.1 122.1
Japan 45.2 90.5 113.8 104.4
USA 245.7 186.6 179.9 143.5
West Germany 97.5 142.0 163.7 116.8
Marketed services
France – 132.3 143.2 136.0
USA – 156.9 150.3 137.8
West Germany – 100.6 115.4 133.5
Table 1 Relative productivity in maufacturing and marketed services
UK = 100 in each year
Sources: For manufacturing, Pilat (1996) extended to 1950 and interpolated to 1979 using van Ark (1993) and for services, O’Mahony et al. (1996).
Please note that the Pilat figures are comparisons between the other countries and the USA and were originally expressed using the USA as the base
country. The final year for the services comparison is 1993 not 1995. Productivity is measured as value-added per hour worked.
You don’t have to be an economic historian to realise that international
monetary supremacy confers substantial political benefits.
Continued on page 32
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ome of the brightest minds in Europe are, it is
alleged, looking for the third way: the formula that
offers improved economic performance in general
and labour market performance in particular
without the inequalities characteristic of the American
economy. To the right of the third way is said to lie social
disintegration, to the left, economic inefficiency. But does
this third way exist? And if it does, how will we recognise
it? Critics of the search argue that there is no third way:
that it is impossible in the modern world to combine a
dynamic economy with social stability – that there is an
inevitable trade off between the two. I too am sceptical, but
of the search, not the solution. I believe there is a third way,
but I also believe it’s more familiar than many recognise or
are prepared to accept. The danger is that in the search 
for something new and different we overlook policies of
proven effectiveness.
How the search started
The search for a new and distinctive approach to economic
policy has its origins in a simple diagnosis of the source of
the economic problems which face industrialised countries.
Globalisation and changes in technology, it is argued, mean
we live increasingly in a winner takes all world, where the
gap between winners and losers in society is constantly
widening. Economists have summarised this in the rather
inelegant phrase skill-biased change. It is also argued that
the economic problems take different forms in different
countries. In the US and the UK, for instance, with their
relatively limited welfare states and weak trade unions,
there have been dramatic increases in wage inequality – to
levels not seen since records began. Continental European
countries have, by contrast, prevented this rise in wage
inequality, but at the price of much higher unemployment.
But these apparently contrasting changes are simply two
sides of the same coin, two symptoms of the disease. If the
diagnosis is correct, therefore, industrial economies have
changed in a way which means the old fixes no longer
work: new policies are needed for a new world, in other
words, a third way.
But is it misguided?
The idea that economic forces are responsible for the
widening gap between winners and losers is elegantly
simple and thus appealing; and this argument has rapidly
become conventional wisdom – especially amongst the
winners. But it is mistaken to be seduced so easily: when
examined more closely, the evidence in support of this view
looks much less persuasive. If skill-biased change were the
cause of the rise in unemployment in Europe, it would
follow that this rise should be concentrated among the
lower-skilled. Yet although the CEP has examined this
phenomenon in several different ways, we have all reached
the same broad conclusion: the rise in unemployment in
continental Europe is more or less uniform across all skill
groups. These countries show little evidence of a dramatic
shift in favour of skilled workers. So what is happening in
labour markets of OECD countries?
Unemployment has gone up...
The prevailing view among economists is that high
unemployment in continental Europe is the result of
deficiencies in the structure of these countries’ labour
markets. There is a consensus that reforms are needed;
but a different view on what those reforms should be: a
shift towards the Anglo-Saxon model; or the adoption of
completely new policies – the third way. No one can deny
the facts: the unemployment performance of the US is far
superior to that of most of continental Europe (though it’s
The 
third way?
Alan Manning, of the CEP’s industrial programme
argues that pressing the right switch for economic
success need not mean ditching past policies
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by Alan Manning
worth remembering how recent the American
advantage is – West German unemployment
was below that of the US until the early
1990s). But there is an alternative, if rather
more mundane, explanation for what has
been happening to these economies. This is
not that there has been a structural change
requiring structural reform, but that high
unemployment has resulted from the very
tight macro-economic policies pursued to
meet the targets for economic and monetary
union. This is not an argument that gets 
much attention.
...but whose fault was it?
Europe’s central bankers believe unemploy-
ment is largely a structural problem, that
cutting interest rates to expand demand
would quickly lead to rising wage inflation.
They subscribe to the theory that monetary
policy cannot, in the long run, affect the level
of unemployment. This is not at all a surpris-
ing view for central bankers to hold. One
might, however, think that governments
committed to social cohesion might be less
convinced by the structural diagnosis of
unemployment. But European governments
are completely hamstrung by their political commitment to
monetary union. If high levels of unemployment aren’t struc-
tural in origin, they must be the result of macroeconomic
policies; but these policies are determined largely by the
need to qualify for monetary union. To criticise them would
be to jeopardise the project. And any attempt to persuade
central bankers to mellow out a little is met with accusa-
tions of political interference and is said to augur badly for
the future independence of the European Central Bank.
The end result of all this is that the central bankers’ view –
that unemployment is influenced by labour market institu-
tions and nothing to do with them – has prevailed. The
politicians may be privately unconvinced but they have little
control over interest rates and dare not be seen to criticise
central bankers overtly. So nothing happens: and there is
now a real danger that continental Europe faces a
prolonged period of stagnation. Perhaps the closest histori-
cal parallel is with Britain between the two world wars,
when the return to the Gold Standard in 1925 at an
absurdly high exchange rate consigned the UK to double-
digit unemployment virtually until the Second World War.
But how to choose?
The sources of these higher levels of European unemploy-
ment are therefore crucial in deciding on the appropriate
remedy. The problem is that the evidence is unclear.
Consider the UK. It’s clear that there have been major
changes in the UK labour market since Mrs Thatcher came
to power in 1979. Trade union influence has
declined, welfare benefits have fallen relative
to earnings, minimum wages have been
abolished and marginal tax rates for high
earners have been slashed. The result of
these changes is seen most clearly in the
enormous rise in wage inequality – to the
highest levels since statistics were first
collected more than a century ago.
Many economists claim that these labour
market changes have also been responsible
for the current relatively low level of UK
unemployment. But this is far more difficult to
demonstrate convincingly. It is impossible to
detect any evidence of an improvement in
performance until after 1993 – a period in
which UK macroeconomic policy was expan-
sionary following Britain’s undignified exit
from the exchange rate mechanism (ERM) in
late 1992. After that event, sterling was
devalued by around 15%, interest rates were
gradually cut to their lowest level for 25 years
and the government deficit peaked at around
8% of GDP. In macroeconomic policy 
terms, the foot was flat down on the acceler-
ator and the ensuing fall in unemployment
was hardly surprising. What is surprising –
and significant – is that it has fallen so low without any
resurgence in inflation.
As has already been noted, the other distinctive feature of
both the UK and the US economies during the 1980s and
1990s is the extent to which inequality has risen. There has
been an unprecedented redistribution from poor to rich
(though this has slowed in recent years) largely justified in
the name of progress: that this was an inevitable feature of
changes in technology and the global economy that were
propelling us towards the winner takes all society. There is
probably some truth in this idea, although it is striking that it
has been argued most strongly by those who have gained
most from the changes which have taken place. But the
extent to which these changes led to falls in unemployment
is at least questionable: research in both countries, for
instance, suggests that while changes in the level of
minimum wage have quite large effects on redistribution,
the impact on employment is quite small.
A history lesson
The post-war period was essentially one long boom in the
industrial countries, during which incomes grew at an
unprecedented rate and unemployment rates were at
historically very low levels. Unemployment rates in the main
European economies were below the level in the US – even
though most of the structural differences in the labour
markets already existed. Optimism that the secret of
successful economic management had been discovered
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If the source of
Europe’s unemployment
woes is indeed 
overly tight 
macroeconomic policy,
the search for the
solution is somewhat
less exciting.
led to the continued expansion of the welfare
state in many countries: it is relatively cheap
to be generous to those without work when
there are fewer of them. All this came to a
halt with the very sharp rises in oil prices in
the 1970s (though hindsight suggests that
the boom had already become unsustain-
able). Unemployment rose sharply in all
OECD countries. 
Governments responded to the crisis in differ-
ent ways, most seeing it as a temporary
problem. Some tried to prevent the rise in
unemployment by restricting the ability of
employers to fire workers; others tried to
ease the effects of unemployment by
measures such as an extension of the period
for which unemployment benefits were
payable. But the results were much the same:
by 1980, unemployment was around 10%
both in the US and Europe. The main differ-
ence was that the more generous welfare
systems in Europe meant that these levels of
unemployment created much bigger
problems for the public finances.
The 80s turning point
It was at this point that the experience began to diverge.
Unemployment started to fall in the US in the early 1980s,
but not in Europe. Institutions did matter: it was harder for
the necessary adjustments to be made in European labour
markets. Firms became cautious about hiring staff because
of the difficulties involved in laying off workers. By the mid
1980s European unemployment finally began to fall. But
this turned out to be a relatively short-lived trend – it was
reversed in the late 1980s and the explanation of this rever-
sal is crucial to the debate about the third way. 
Those who take the structural view argue that the European
recovery ended when wage inflation started to rise, provid-
ing evidence that the natural rate of European unemploy-
ment had shifted upwards. But critics of this view argue
that the boom ended not in a burst of inflation but when the
Bundesbank slammed on the brakes and raised interest
rates in a response to German unification. Those European
countries which were in the ERM had to follow suit and
raise their interest as well or realign. The drive to economic
and monetary union ruled out the latter option for most
ERM members. The recovery therefore ground to a halt and
those economies have stagnated as their central banks
have continued to bear down on inflation.
The story for the UK is somewhat different, of course. Its
1980s boom ended in rapidly rising inflation at a time when
unemployment was much higher than we see today. But
there were other factors which account for this: the deregu-
lation of the housing market and the associated explosion in
house prices, and the weaker position of the
pound all gave an extra boost to inflation.
Is macro policy the key?
If the source of Europe’s unemployment
woes is indeed overly tight macroeconomic
policy, the search for the solution is
somewhat less exciting. The solution is
there: will it be implemented? It’s clear that
there can now be no relaxation of policy
before monetary union starts; and once EMU
has begun the new European Central Bank
may be anxious to demonstrate its virility to
the financial markets by maintaining a tight
grip on inflation. There is no inevitable
conflict between monetary union and low
unemployment, but in current circumstances
there may be. The decision by the Banque
de France to raise interest rates last 
year was clearly not related to the needs of
the French labour market.
In the US and the UK, untroubled by the
commitment to monetary union, redistribution
is a greater concern. For them, the third way
involves not a radical new solution but a
return to the path they have followed before
– strengthening those institutions which reduce wage
inequality. There are signs they may already be moving in
this direction: the US has raised its minimum wage, the UK
is about to introduce one. Tax reductions in future are likely
to be concentrated on improving work incentives at the
bottom end of the income distribution rather than at the top.
No third way but no complacency
None of this is meant to sound complacent. There are
changes which need to be made to continental European
labour markets, particularly in reversing some of the
measures first adopted during the 1970s’ oil price crises
and some of the over-ambitious extensions to the welfare
state and the collective bargaining systems introduced just
prior to those crises. And the US and the UK should not
return exactly to their old redistributive systems. Welfare
states do need to change, perhaps more for social reasons
(such as the increased involvement of women in the 
labour market and the rise in single parent families) than
economic ones. 
But I question the need for a radical new vision. European
labour market institutions served us very well in the 1960s.
They can do so again.
Alan Manning is a member of the CEP’s Industrial Relations
Programme and Professor of Economics at the LSE.
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To the right of the
third way is said 
to lie social
disintegration, to 
the left, economic
inefficiency. But does
this third way exist?
And if it does, how
will we recognise it?
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guide decision-making and
institutional design:
• stability through constrained
discretion; 
• credibility through sound, long-term
policies; 
• credibility through maximum
transparency; 
• the principle of trust through 
pre-commitment.
Stability
The first principle embodies the pro-
stability but post-monetarist
intellectual consensus upon which
modern macroeconomic policy-
making is based. The pursuit of
stability through adherence to fixed
policy rules – the experience of the
1980s – is no longer common
practice. Why? Because the world is
too complex, with relationships
previously considered stable breaking
down. In a rules-based approach –
where the goal is to stick to the policy
rule – then one must stick to the rule.
But if the aim of policy is to keep
inflation low and stable, and growth
as high and stable as possible, then
sticking to policy rules (as a goal in
itself) can lead to failure.
Hence the first principle – stability
through constrained discretion: the
acceptance of discretionary
macroeconomic policy to respond
flexibly to different economic shocks
– constrained, of course, by the need
to meet the low inflation objective or
target over time. But if the need for
discretion was so obvious, then why
the attraction to fixed policy rules in
the first place? Governments sought
something more than simplicity – 
that extra something was credibility.
Or to use economics jargon, to 
make policymaking time consistent 
by ensuring that a government
actually has the incentives to 
achieve the future goals to which it
has committed.
The old route to credibility was fixed
policy rules. But fixed policy rules did
not deliver credibility, far from it.
Because the government had staked
its credentials on following rules, it –
New principles for
government
In its first year in
office, Britain’s new
Labour government
introduced important
reforms in the
conduct of economic
policy. Guest
columnist Ed Balls,
Economic Adviser to
Chancellor Gordon
Brown, explains 
the thinking behind
the changes.
GUEST COLUMN
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ransparency is at the heart of
the new government’s
economic approach. Open
and accountable institutions
and procedures improve the
information flows and promote public
understanding and trust which are
vital to ensuring stability. A lack of
openness and transparency breeds
instability and confusion. This is truer
than ever in a world of global capital
markets. The power of the markets is
always and everywhere: dollar
slumps on bad trade news,
Deutschemark rises on good inflation
news, or, as the Wall Street Journal
once reported in its headline, Dow-
Jones falls on no news.
Macroeconomic stability – low and
stable inflation and sound public
finances – is essential. It is a
fundamental pre-condition to
achieving the government’s economic
objectives – high and stable levels of
growth and employment. But changes
in both the world economy and our
economic understanding of it over the
past twenty years mean that 
policymakers must pursue stability
through new means. Gone are the
days of fixed policy rules announced
in public and of private deliberations
behind closed finance ministry doors,
with little or no justification or
explanation about policy decisions 
or mistakes. 
New policymaker guidelines
In a world of global capital markets
where policy through fixed rules
announced in public and discussed 
in private has been discredited in
theory and practice, governments
must take a different route to
ensuring macroeconomic credibility
and stability. New principles must
and the economy – was immediately
faced with paying a heavy price for
breaking them – not simply in lost
output but also lost credibility. So
what is the modern route to credibility
which preserves discretion? 
Credibility
The rapid globalisation of the world
economy has made achieving
credibility more rather than less
important, particularly for a new
government with no track-record.
This process of globalisation has
many dimensions – technological
change, capital market liberalisation
and the growth and global reach of
international trade. For
macroeconomic policymaking the
most significant change is the
globalisation of international capital
markets. But far from rendering
governments impotent, global capital
markets actually render governments
more powerful in their ability to do
bad or good – because the main
dimensions on which they have now
influence are scale and speed rather
than direction. 
Governments which pursue monetary
and fiscal policies not seen to be
sustainable in the long term, and,
worse, attempt to conceal the fact
through short-term diversion or deceit
while delaying the necessary
corrective action, are punished hard
these days – and much more rapidly
than thirty or forty years ago. Once
such a mistake occurs, it can take a
long time to repair the damage, in
terms of lost credibility, and so rebuild
the ability to deliver stability through
discretion. Conversely, governments
which pursue, and are judged by the
markets to be pursuing, sound
monetary and fiscal policies, can
quickly attract significant inflows of
investment capital. Furthermore, they
can use discretionary monetary, or
indeed fiscal, policy to deal with
macroeconomic shocks which 
need to be accommodated in the
short term. 
So we reach the second principle –
credibility through sound long-term
policies: in a world of rapidly mobile
capital, governments can have policy
credibility and maintain policy
discretion if they pursue, and are
seen to be pursuing, monetary and
fiscal policies which are well
understood and sustainable over the
long term and where problems are
spotted and tackled promptly rather
than disguised, while the government
clings to intermediate indicators to
prop up credibility.
The problem with this second
principle is that, while a step in the
right direction, it still rather begs the
question of how credibility can be
achieved and the time inconsistency
by Ed Balls
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Gone are the days of fixed
policy rules announced in
public and of private
deliberations behind closed
finance ministry doors, with
little or no justification or
explanation about policy
decisions or mistakes. 
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problem solved, especially for a new
government with no track record. 
Maximum transparency
At the heart of the time inconsistency
problem is imperfect information –
about the true state of the macro-
economy and, more importantly,
about the true motivations of
policymakers. Discretion for 
policymakers would be
straightforward if it were always
immediately clear what discretionary
action was needed and why. But
suspicion over motivation, and
asymmetry of information between
government and the public lead to
heavy blows to credibility when
things go wrong.
The greater the transparency about
government objectives and the
reasons why decisions are taken, the
more information about outcomes
that is published as a matter of
routine, and the more checks on the
ability of government to manipulate
the flow of information, the less likely
it is that investors will be suspicious
of the government’s intentions, the
greater the flexibility of policy to 
react to real crises and the easier 
it is to build a consensus for 
difficult decisions. 
This principle takes us part, but not
all of the way, to credible discretion.
It makes cheating on policy mistakes
less likely and more costly – so
helping to ease the time
inconsistency problem. But alone it
does not solve the problem. 
Pre-commitment
We live in a dynamic world in which
reputation matters. Government can
get away with cheating once, but
only at the cost of future reputation.
Once cheated, the public and
markets expect it again and again.
Providing full information about the
government’s objectives and whether
it is meeting them, makes failure to
take a long-term view too costly to
contemplate. But it is possible to go
further still. Institutional mechanisms
can be established which make clear
that it is the government's intention
to do the right thing – to make, in the
jargon of game theory, a strategic
pre-commitment. The more
institutional arrangements can
demonstrate that policy is truly trying
to achieve its declared objectives,
and the more difficult it is for the
government to cheat by breaking
promises or aiming for different
objectives, the more the public and
investors will believe that decisions
are being taken for sound long-
term reasons. 
Principles into practice
Since coming into office, the
government has put in place new
monetary and fiscal policy
frameworks which are informed by,
and consistent with, these principles.
In monetary policy the most
important economic reform that the
new government has introduced is
operational independence for the
Bank of England. Under legislation,
the Bank is committed to setting
monetary policy to achieve price
stability as defined by the
government’s inflation target. This
institutional reform pre-commits the
government to a clear monetary
policy of low inflation and, without
prejudice to that, to support the
objectives for growth and
employment. This secondary
objective is important because it
makes clear that the Bank has
(constrained) discretion to respond
intelligently to supply-side shocks,
using the open letter procedure.
These same principles have also
been applied to fiscal policy, which is
now set to achieve clear and
unambiguous rules: the Golden Rule
– to balance the current budget on
average over the economic cycle –
and to stabilise the ratio of debt-to-
GDP at a stable and prudent level
over the economic cycle. These are
transparent and cannot easily be
changed as the cycle progresses.
Importantly, while the government
has pre-committed to sound long-
term fiscal policies, the discretion to
use fiscal policy, if necessary, to
respond to economic shocks has
been preserved.
These policy changes have
accompanied and underpinned
institutional steps to increase policy
credibility. The National Audit Office
now considers the conventions used
in Budget decision-making to ensure
that sound, defensible, assumptions
are used. The Pre-Budget Report
process serves to open the Budget
process and increase consultation. 
Finally, the Code for Fiscal Stability
enshrines openness and
transparency in legislation. The Code
requires the government to set fiscal
policy objectives consistent with five
principles of fiscal management:
transparency, stability, responsibility,
efficiency and fairness, and to report
openly and regularly on performance
against them. 
So in fiscal policy, as in monetary
policy, the new government acted
early to boost its policy credibility.
Discretion has been preserved. A
sound long-term basis for policy,
with clear targets, has been
established. Policymaking is more
transparent than in the past.
Changes at the Bank of England,
the Code for Fiscal Stability and the
new role for the NAO, guarantee
this long-term commitment to
stability will be maintained. 
Will this make for better policy? Only
time will tell. Clear principles, sound
institutional reforms, and a genuine
commitment to transparency and
accountability, create the conditions
for better policymaking. But it is
results that count. Outcomes speak
louder than reforms. 
Edward Balls is the Chancellor’s
Economic Adviser.
Clear principles, sound institutional reforms, and a genuine commitment to transparency
and accountability, create the conditions for better policymaking.
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E
ven by the standards of international summitry it
was a nail-biting finish. Not until the final hours of
the Kyoto Summit could anyone be certain that an
agreement on greenhouse gas emissions would be
reached. The arguments – especially between the industrial
countries on the one hand and the developing countries on
the other – were bitter. They were also plagued by confu-
sion, particularly about the difference between the reducing
global cost of cutting emissions and the way the burden of
these costs were shared. Central to the dispute was
American insistence that any deal to cut greenhouse gas
emissions should be accompanied by a new scheme of
global trading in emission permits. 
The American view prevailed: the Kyoto deal made provi-
sion for a trading scheme central to the strategy for overall
cuts in emissions. But ratification of the agreement by all
the signatories is still some way off, and depends crucially
on the creation of a workable scheme for emissions
trading. The accumulating evidence about the extent to
which such schemes have been successful in the US
underlines the extent to which agreement in principle is only
half the battle. It’s the details of any scheme which can
make or break it – and the Kyoto negotiators must ensure
they learn the right lessons from past experience.
The problem’s familiar...
The worries about the impact of global warming are all too
familiar. The growing emission of greenhouse gases into
the atmosphere concern scientists who fear that the subse-
quent build-up of these gases – of which carbon dioxide is
the main one – will raise global temperatures significantly.
Emissions themselves don’t directly cause the problem,
rather the concentration of gases in the atmosphere. 
Such concentrations have already increased by about 
30% since the middle of the last century.
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change has predicted that if no action
were taken to limit emissions, concentra-
tions of carbon dioxide could increase by
a further 6% by 2010. 
...as is the solution
Much more difficult to predict, of course,
is the impact of these expected climatic
changes, and their economic conse-
A lot of hot air?
The Kyoto deal and emissions trading
Negotiators are hard at work trying to turn the Kyoto Protocol agreed
last December into an effective means for reducing greenhouse gas
emissions and so halt the process of global warming. The central
feature of the deal was the – controversial – introduction of a scheme
for emissions trading. Daniel Sturm of the CEP assesses new
evidence which the negotiators should draw on to make a global
trading scheme a success.
by Daniel Sturm
Economists, however, have long
advocated a market-based approach
to pollution control: so that emission
reductions are achieved by altering
the price incentives polluters face
rather than by direct regulation. 
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quences. Such uncertainties
have been seized on by those
resistant to the need for big
global reductions in greenhouse
gas emissions. But contrary to
the perception of some people,
this was not the source of the
disagreements at Kyoto. Indeed,
the Protocol signed last
December has been seen as an
important step in creating a global response to the
problems of climate change. The industrial countries and
those economies classed as being in transition have
accepted a legally binding commitment to reduce their
emissions by about 5% from 1990 levels by the period
2008-2012. (The Protocol places no limits on emissions
from developing countries.) These new limits on emissions
are expected to have a small but significant impact on
concentrations by 2010.
Although it’s the concentration levels which matter in
climatic terms, emission levels are the means by which
these can be controlled in future; and controlling emissions
is hugely expensive. Estimates of the annual cost simply of
stabilising emissions at 1990 levels currently range from
0.4% to 1.3% of world GDP in 2010. The search is there-
fore on for ways to limit these costs. Kyoto broke new
ground in this search by introducing provisions for trading
in emission rights. Indeed, these provisions are crucial to
the success of the deal: not only should they help reduce
the cost of emission controls, but the United States has
refused to ratify the Kyoto Protocol without a satisfactory
trading scheme.
The economic rationale
Environmental policymaking in the past has been dominated
by the command and control approach: this has specified
either the control technologies to be used or set the
emission limits to be attained for specific pollution sources.
Economists, however, have long advocated a market-based
approach to pollution control: so that emission reductions
are achieved by altering the price incentives polluters face
rather than by direct regulation. Tradeable emission permits
are a good example of this market-based approach.
The basic structure of such a
scheme is simple enough. The first
step is to agree on the total reduc-
tion in emissions (5% for the
countries covered by the Kyoto
Protocol). Then the total amount of
emissions permitted after the
reductions have been made is
divided up into allowances – for
example, one allowance might
mean a permit to emit say one tonne of CO2 each year.
These allowances are then shared out among the partici-
pants of the scheme, according to a pre-arranged formula.
The idea is that these allowances, or permits, can be
traded on a market: essentially allowing permits to pollute
to be bought and sold. Then at the end of each year, an
independent regulator compares the actual emissions of
each polluter with the size of the allowances held. Any
individual, company or country which generates more
emissions than their permits entitle them to will be
penalised, just as they would under the traditional regula-
tory approach. 
But why would such a scheme be expected to reduce the
cost of implementing overall reductions in emissions? The
answer lies in the fact that the costs of reducing emissions
is likely to vary across companies and countries. If every-
one had to reduce their total emissions by a certain amount
some would find it easy and therefore cheap to meet the
target; others would find it very expensive indeed. Trading
permits for emissions enables parties with very different
costs to engage in a mutually beneficial exchange. Those
with low costs will find it attractive to reduce their
emissions even further than the target reduction and then
profit from the sale of the excess permits they don’t need.
But those for whom any emissions reduction would be
expensive could find it cheaper to buy someone else’s
permits instead. 
Provided the transactions costs of this trade in
emission permits is kept small, the result will be
that emission reductions are made wherever it’s
cheapest to do so. Eventually trading will
equalise the marginal cost of emission reduc-
tions for everyone and so ensure that the global
costs are kept to the minimum.
But these benefits are likely, if anything, to
understate the cost savings to be had from
emission trading. Consider a polluter who is
forced to use a specific pollution control technol-
ogy. He has clearly little incentive to find new and cheaper
ways of controlling pollution. But under a tradeable permit
scheme, each polluter would be free to choose any means
of keeping emissions in line with the permits held. There is
then an incentive to cut the cost of reducing emissions,
because that would then provide the opportunity to sell
unused permits on the market.
Greenhouse gases inflict
the same global damage
no matter where on 
the planet they were
originally released.
The growing emission of greenhouse
gases into the atmosphere concern
scientists who fear that the subsequent
build-up of these gases – of which
carbon dioxide is the main one – will
raise global temperatures significantly. 
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Attempts have been made to quantify these potential
savings. In 1995 the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change examined models which try to simulate the savings
from a trading scheme compared with a system of uniform
reductions in emissions across countries. Such models
don’t take account of the benefits from technological
innovation which might flow from a tradable scheme. And
the Panel found huge variations in the estimates of savings
to be had: from 10% to 50% of the total cost of making
emission reductions. But it’s significant that all the current
models agree that there would be savings under such a
scheme. It’s also worth remembering that given the scale
of the costs involved, even a 10% reduction amounts to a
huge amount of money.
Moreover, all these savings can be achieved without any
reduction in the environmental benefits to be gained from
emission reduction. Greenhouse gases inflict the same
global damage no matter where on the planet they were
originally released. Changes in the way emission reduc-
tions are made – cutting them in one part of the world,
raising them in another – can have no negative impact on
climate change.
But is it fair?
It’s the arguments about equity that have muddled the
debate about emissions trading. Critics argue that it lets
the industrial countries, and in particular the United States,
buy their way out of their responsibility to reduce
emissions. It’s clear from the nature of the discussions
both in Rio and Kyoto that the equitable distribution of the
burden of reducing greenhouse gas emissions is an impor-
tant and a contentious issue. The Rio Convention of 1992
incorporates the now famous principle that all countries
have a common but differentiated responsibility for protec-
tion of the climate system.
The concept of equity is important because of the huge
discrepancies in greenhouse gas emissions between the
industrial and the developing countries. In 1990, the US
alone accounted for about 35% of total CO2 emissions,
and the European Union countries for another 23%.
Emissions per head show an even starker contrast with the
developing countries: in the latter, CO2 emissions currently
average 0.5 tonnes a year, compared with an average of 3
tonnes a year in the industrial world. Many people, and
especially those in the developing countries, argue that
these figures make it imperative for the industrial countries
to take the lead in reducing emissions.
This is where the confusion is at its greatest. The purpose
of emissions trading is to keep the global costs of reduc-
ing emissions as low as possible; such schemes are not
about how the burden of reduction is shared. It’s the initial
distribution of allowances which determines how such
responsibility is divided up. Giving a larger allocation of
permits to developing countries, for instance, would raise
the cost of emission reductions to industrial countries
because they would end up having to buy more emission
permits on the market. By doing so, they would shoulder
more of the financial burden of emission reduction, while
trading ensures that emissions are reduced wherever this
can be done most cheaply.
Putting theory into practice
The negotiators now drawing up a trading scheme know
how much is riding on the plan they come up with. New
data on the way such schemes have been operating offer
important indicators for developing a successful scheme.
Virtually all such schemes are in the US, where experience
shows that the details can make the difference between
success and complete failure.
In the early seventies the very first trading provisions were
introduced into the American Clean Air Act, which covers
several pollutants, including sulphur dioxide, nitrous oxide
The purpose of emissions
trading is to keep the
global costs of reducing
emissions as low as
possible; such schemes are
not about how the burden
of reduction is shared.
The equitable distribution of the burden of
reducing greenhouse gas emissions is an
important and a 
contentious issue.
All the current
models agree that
there would be
savings under such
a scheme.
and lead. This early trading differed substantially from a full-
blown trading scheme. Trade had to be approved on a
case-by-case basis with expensive approval procedures
that could take up to two years. The performance of the
market was very disappointing with much fewer transac-
tions taking place then expected. Although annual cost
savings were estimated at anywhere between $100m and
$1400m this represented only a small percentage of total
expenditure on air pollution control. Most observers agree
that the central problem was the enormous complexity of
the original regulations – these just prevented many cost
saving trades from taking place.
In 1990 the trading provisions were fundamentally
reformed. A market close to the textbook ideal was intro-
duced to combat acid raid from sulphur dioxide emissions.
The scheme, which is still the largest pollution market, in
operation, is targeted at the electric utilities which account
for over two thirds of total sulphur dioxide emissions. By
2000, the aim is to reduce emissions by a very ambitious
50% compared with 1980 levels. There is minimal interfer-
ence with permit trading, with the role of the regulator
limited to recording transfers and determining compliance
at the end of each year.
After a cautious start to trading in 1993, activity under this
programme has picked up remarkably, with trades doubling
on average every year since 1993. With such large trading
volumes the market is expected to generate savings of
around 50% compared with the traditional approach to
emission reductions. The US General Accounting Office is
now projecting savings of around $3 billion annually by
2000. Compare this with a different scheme, to reduce
pollution from pulp manufacturers in the Fox River. This
could bring savings of around $7 billion, said the scheme’s
architects. In fact, the rules were so complex, that only one
trade was ever recorded.
Transaction costs are what really matter
The key lesson that emerges from the American experience
is overwhelming: keeping transaction costs low is much the
most important requirement for a successful trading
scheme. If the rules aren’t as simple as possible, most of
the incentives for engaging in trading will be removed – and
at least a significant portion of trades won’t take place. The
Kyoto Protocol is worryingly unclear in this area. Of the
provisions that deal with trading among the industrial
countries, one seems to envisage a case-by-case approach
similar to the original US scheme, along with the compli-
cated rules likely to deter trading. But other parts of the
Protocol seem to envisage a scheme on the lines of that
operating successfully in the American sulphur dioxide
market. Which of these options is pursued further will be
crucial in determining whether or not a greenhouse gas
trading scheme is successful.
Since developing countries have no emission limits set
under the Kyoto agreement, trading between them and the
industrial countries will have to be on a case-by-case basis.
The Protocol provides for the industrial
countries to acquire extra emission permits by
financing projects to reduce emissions in
developing countries below what they would
otherwise have been. This last definition is, of
course, highly contentious in the absence of
agreed emission limits for the developing
world. Nevertheless, transparent and simple
rules will be crucial if excessive transaction
costs are to be avoided, and trading encour-
aged.
The jury’s still out
It’s an old cliche to say that the devil is in the detail. In this
case, however, it’s true. Much of this detail will be high on
the agenda of the next meeting of the parties to the Protocol
in Buenos Aires in November this year. The Kyoto Protocol
does offer the prospect of a workable deal on controlling
greenhouse gas emissions. Limiting rather than halting the
build-up of greenhouse gases may seem a modest achieve-
ment, but it’s one which seemed likely to prove elusive 
a year ago. The negotiators know they still have a long way
to go.
Daniel Sturm is a Research Assistant in the International
Economic Performance Programme at the CEP. 
The Kyoto Protocol
does offer the prospect
of a workable deal on
controlling greenhouse
gas emissions.
The key lesson that emerges from the
American experience is overwhelming:
keeping transaction costs low is 
much the most important requirement
for a successful trading scheme.
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W
hen economists invented
growth accounting in the
late 1950s, they found
that technical change
accounted for almost 90% of US
economic growth in the first half of the
20th century. Accumulation of physical
capital-investment in machines,
construction, heavy metal explained
less than one-eighth of the four-fold
increase in prosperity of then-
recorded history’s most 
dynamic economy.
Technical change...
Two things are remarkable about this.
First, that period in the history of
economic thought is supposed to be
dominated by economic theorists
obsessed with Soviet-style
accumulation of factor inputs as the
route to economic success. Wrong.
Academic literature of the early
twentieth century shows a profound
interest in understanding the sources
and implications of technical change.
The literature might not have got very
far, but the supposedly modern
concerns were already there.
Second, the US economy, in real life,
was then no playground of rocket
science. It was not chock-full of nifty
technological whizz-bang gizmos, the
way the Western world is today. It
was not moved by the learned
debate of scientific societies and the
ferment of intellectual excitement and
engineering discovery the way that,
say, England was during the
Industrial Revolution, with James
Watt and Matthew Boulton’s race
against time at the patents office, or
the intellectual and political battles
between Charles Babbage and
George Airy on, not just the content
but the practice of good science.
Telephones
For communications, the telegraph
and telephone were technologies
Trains, planes 
and technological
advances...
Danny Tyson Quah
The weightless economy should be viewed 
as the logical next stage in economic
development, writes Danny Tyson Quah in his
return to the weightless economy column.
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well in place by the beginning of the
20th century. An earlier time, the
1840s, comprised the period of
greatest telegraph expansion, with
intense rivalry between competing
companies in the US resulting in the
1856 formation of the Western Union
Company. By 1866, a permanent
telegraph cable linked Britain and the
US; by 1872, all the major cities in
the world were similarly connected.
Alexander Graham Bell’s patent for
the telephone was filed in 1876. The
first telephone exchange appeared in
Britain in 1879, removing telephony
from the deathtrap of dedicated,
fixed-line connections. Telegraph and
telephony might well be viewed as
prime technical drivers for the early
20th century; the truth is, these
technologies were already well-
established, and no technical change
in them was new by the time period
studied intensely in early growth
accounting. What technical progress
between 1900 and 1950?
Trains...
Take another example. By the
beginning of the 20th century US
rail track coverage had already
exploded from less than 10,000
miles in 1850 to 20 times that by
1900. No grand technological vision
or a deep insight about the world 
or profound scientific breakthrough
propelled the success that would
come in the half-century afterwards.
By 1900 railroads were a
technology well understood: in
Britain passenger traffic was
providing two-thirds of railway
earnings by the 1840s. US railroad
superiority over Britain and Europe
had to do less with sweeping vision
than with details like whether to
prefer huge freight cars with double
bogies and automatic central
couplers over smaller four-wheeled
wagons that used screw-couplings
and side-buffers: hardly the burning
issue to give sleepness nights to
academics and government
policymakers who can be fretting
instead over education and the
global information infrastructure.
Mass production of Henry Ford’s
Model ‘T’ went online by 1908; the
car would be sold, unchanged for
two decades in design and
implementation, to over 15 million
customers. Where was the
technical change explaining that
90% of economic growth?
And it isn’t just the early part of the
20th century that technology seemed
to move at glacial pace. Even in the
white heat of the Industrial
Revolution in the 18th century, fifty
years after its initial colliery
installation, the Newcomen steam
engine still operated only at 1% fuel
efficiency. It was about that same
length of time before James Watt’s
condenser improvement allowed
keeping the cylinder of the steam
engine hot all the time, instead of the
stressful, inefficient cooling and
reheating between each power
stroke. That’s two human
generations, or the time for a 10
billion-fold increase in modern
computing power.
...and planes
To be sure, not everything points so
clearly to the first half of the 20th
century being a dull period of
technological stagnation. Orville and
Wilbur Wright’s flying machine only
went airborne in 1903, and airplane
technology developed from then. 
But commercial aircraft, like the
space-age technologies coming out
of the Second World War atomic
and nuclear energy, mainframe
computers, television only really
affected ordinary people’s lives later,
after 1950.
No, for the technologists among us
(say, those who pore over the new
electronic devices streaming out of
Microsoft, Intel, Netscape, or Sony,
and appearing on the World Wide
Web every month), the US in the
early 20th century for all its frenetic
dynamic growth and its global
technological leadership would have
been boring beyond belief. But in
spite of this, almost all US 
economic success then was due 
to technical change.
Now weightlessness
Of course, those familiar with recent
research on total factor productivity
might challenge my holding firm to
Robert Solow’s 1957 estimate of
87.5% for technology’s contribution
to early 20th century US economic
growth. But that discussion will have
to wait for a future column. I am
concerned here with why the
weightless economy should be
viewed as the logical next stage if it’s
not already here in this economic
development, and why society’s
response to it matters.
One of the most visible manifestations
of modern technical progress is
information and communications
technology (ICT), a large part of the
weightless economy. The real price of
computing has been falling by 30%
per year for the last two decades, a
halving every two to three years.
Communications too has seen its real
price decline, although only by a
relatively modest (but still spectacular)
8% per year for the last 70 years.
Technical progress at this rate is
unprecedented. How much more it
must now be contributing to long-run
economic growth. History records
few other instances of similarly large,
extended changes in the relative price
of goods so intensely used by
businesses and consumers.
This last is key: ICT and other
elements of the weightless economy
are now actually employed and
demanded by significant portions 
of society.
Similarly, the rampaging supply of
technology during the Industrial
Revolution in the West was matched
by a voracious appetite in
technology’s users, either by other
suppliers or by final consumers
themselves. Supply alone, no matter
how hi-tech and chockfull of good
ideas takes society nowhere, if
unmatched by demand.
Lessons from China?
The saddest example of this one with
lessons perhaps for those fearful of
Mass production of Henry Ford’s Model ‘T’ went online by 1908; the car would
be sold, unchanged for two decades in design and implementation.
technology in the new weightless
economy is the utter failure of the
Industrial Revolution to take off in
ancient China, where all technological
prerequisites were already present
long before the late 18th century.
Everything petered out. Why?
In information processing, China had
the putative headstart. It introduced
paper 1,000 years before the West,
and printing about 700AD. Chinese
water clocks of 1086AD were more
accurate than contemporaneous
European mechanical ones. For
transforming the material world
around them, the Chinese were
casting iron in blast furnaces by
200BC, centuries earlier than in
Europe; spinning wheels for textiles
and water power were developed at
about the same time as in the West.
The Chinese invented gunpowder:
that they made only fireworks from it,
not weapons for killing is to their
credit, not as Rousseau said and
many commonly think, a sign of
backwardness.
Or maybe not!
Yet, in the presence of all these
technological prerequisites, China
did not experience an Industrial
Revolution to set the world afire. It
was ahead of the world in 1300; it
was far behind by 1900.
Why? The supply side of technology
was present; the demand side was
not. The Chinese state committed
what, with hindsight, we now know
to be an egregious sequence of
mistakes. In China, most
technological development was in
the hands of the government
bureaucratic elite. New technology
was controlled and not permitted to
be widely used by the population.
Indeed, the state saw a subversion
of its power as the most likely
outcome should the populace learn
of and articulate a demand for the
new technology. No diffusion of
ideas and tools took place, and the
Industrial Revolution that might have
been instead died.
What does this have to do with the
weightless economy? The easy
interpretation is that the weightless
economy is the for-now culmination
of technological development.
Whether society embraces its fruits
and, through the usual workings of
the marketplace, goes on to
encourage further its development
matters a great deal.
It will determine whether the 21st
century mirrors the Europe of 
the Industrial Revolution or 14th
century China
Danny Tyson Quah is Director of the
CEP’s National Economic Performance
Programme and Professor of Economics
at the LSE.
http://econ.lse.ac.uk/~dquah/
The Chinese state committed what, with hindsight, we now know to be
an egregious sequence of mistakes. In China, most technological
development was in the hands of the government bureaucratic elite.
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t’s no big secret that the world is
changing – fast. Indeed, it’s
fashionable to argue that the pace
of change is accelerating all the
time. Much effort – in the pages of
CentrePiece and elsewhere – goes
into analysing the nature of change.
But it is not clear that the implications
of many global economic shifts are
always fully understood. This seems
particularly true in the area of public
policy – where governments
themselves often fail to grasp the full
significance of what is happening – or
at least do so only belatedly. 
Economic policy tends still to be seen
as something governments determine,
and can see through. They like to take
credit when things go right and for
that reason, in democracies at any
rate, they still tend to get the blame
when things go wrong. Governments
in office during periods of economic
growth, for instance, stand a better
chance of re-election than those who
preside over economic downturns and
rising unemployment. Governments
actively encourage voters to 
believe which party is in power can
make a difference. 
But can governments really have so
much impact? Is this really how the
world still works, or have things
moved on? Several of the pieces in
this issue give at least a hint of the
extent to which the role of
governments in global economic life
may be changing – whether they like it
or not. 
Money – a globalising force
Hélène Rey rightly talks about the
competition for international monetary
influence likely to develop once the
European single currency, the euro,
comes into being next January. The
euro will provide the first real
challenge to dollar supremacy since
the Second World War: it will alter the
balance of power within the
international monetary system. 
But while there are clear political
advantages for the government 
whose currency is dominant in global
terms, there are disadvantages as
well. That’s partly why in the past
some governments, such as
successive German and Japanese
administrations, have sought
deliberately to avoid reserve 
currency status. 
According to the Rey analysis,
however, this low-key approach may
not be an option for the governments
of the euro zone countries. The
central thrust of her approach is the
determining role of the foreign
exchange markets. To a much greater
degree than in the past it is these
markets which will decide how and to
what extent the balance of
international monetary power shifts.
They will do this quite simply – by the
extent to which they use each
currency. The deregulation of the
international financial markets,
coupled with the technology which
makes the virtually immediate transfer
of huge sums across the exchanges
both possible and commonplace,
gives these markets enormous power.
It is perhaps ironic that just as the
dollar’s dominance looks as if it may
be threatened the political benefits
Honey,
I shrunk the
government
Globalisation is a 
hot topic. But 
have governments
thought about what
the implications for 
them might be? 
Graham Ingham,
editor of CentrePiece,
asks the question.
which have traditionally accompanied
reserve currency status may
themselves be diminishing because 
of the growing power of markets 
over governments. 
Some governments have already had
first-hand experience of the extent to
which domestic policy objectives can
be thwarted by the international
financial markets. The British
government discovered how painful
this can be when sterling was forced
out of the exchange rate mechanism
of the European monetary system in
1992. Several governments in South
East Asia have a much greater
understanding of international market
power than they did a year ago. In
some cases these are governments
who have hitherto benefited from the
growth of international trade and
international financial dealings. They
now know such openness comes at
a price – not being able to do
whatever you want without regard to
the rest of the world.
Good news for the criminals?
It’s not just in the sphere of
economic policy that the globalisation
of money has interfered with
governments’ ability to plough their
chosen furrow. A United Nations
report on drugs, crime and money-
laundering published in June
illustrates the extent to which
international financial deregulation
has permitted the introduction of
money-laundering – especially of
drug-crime profits. About $300
million of foreign exchange
transactions are reckoned to be
illegal in origin. But it’s extremely
difficult to identify such cash, and its
owners, once it is in the system.
International cooperation among
national governments is one way to
tackle such drug-related crime. But
this can only have a real chance of
being effective if every country joins
in. While some states remain, for
whatever reason, outside the loop,
ready to accept anonymous bank
deposits, no questions asked,
international cooperation can at best
be a damage-limitation exercise,
leaving participating governments
frustrated and conscious of the
limitations of power. 
The physical source of illegally
acquired money is as irrelevant to its
owners as the physical location of
the bank deposit. Such deposits are
essentially computer transactions
these days – no physical transfer of
banknotes is involved (except,
perhaps, at the initial stage when
crime proceeds make their way to
the bank). Laundering the profits of
crime isn’t the only activity which is
no longer location-dependent, as
Danny Quah is quick to remind us.
Physical geography is ceasing to be
important for an increasing range of
economic and commercial activity. 
But governments
are constrained
Of course, in the short term at least,
the decision to give more power to
markets ensures that governments
retain a role in the location and
development of such activity. But this
role is arguably a passive one:
governments cannot force individuals
or companies to set up and conduct
business within their territory, they
can only prevent them from doing so
by draconian regulations. Even that
power is being infringed. The
development of satellite and
information technology makes it
increasingly difficult to prevent
commercial activity. How can a
government stop its citizens buying
goods or services from a supplier on
the other side of the world, short of
cutting off telecommunications and
postal services to its residents? 
Elsewhere in these pages, Daniel
Sturm raises some of these issues in
a somewhat different context. It is,
after all, not governments or states
which actually pollute the atmosphere
but individuals and firms in the private
or public sectors within those states.
The Kyoto proposal to implement a
scheme for trading in permits to
pollute will mean that governments
themselves have little control over
where such pollution takes place. The
incentive structure of a trading
scheme is intended to ensure that the
cost of halting or reducing
greenhouse gas emissions is kept to
a global minimum – so that the actual
reductions take place where they can
be implemented most cheaply. This is
a significant shift from the traditional
approach which governments used to
adopt – imposing specific reductions
in each country.
No need to exaggerate 
It is, of course, an oversimplification
to suggest that governments have
lost all their real power. They still
have a major role, an ability to affect
the everyday lives of their citizens
and, in some cases, the citizens 
of other states. It is anyway a
mistake to believe that governments,
in the twentieth century at least,
were always in control of their
destinies; they have often been
forced to react to external events
outside their control. 
Many of the changes now taking
place in the world economy were
initiated and have been encouraged
by some of those states and
governments now finding themselves
most affected, often uncomfortably
so. These changes do seem to imply
that governments will have to rethink
the way they interact with each other,
their citizens and, above all, the
international markets, physical,
electronic and virtual. It’s become
common in the past twenty years or
so to hear governments and
economists talk about the adjustment
process which usually means the
process of economies adjusting to
low inflation, a process which is
painful for many individuals. It may
now be the turn of governments to
experience another kind of
adjustment process – that of
understanding the limits to their
powers – and the best way to exploit
those powers which remain.
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The best overall measure of productivity performance is
total factor productivity growth. In spite of the difficulties of
measurement, on this basis there is some reason to think
that there have been lasting improvements. In the period
1960-73 the UK was in eleventh place on this measure; in
1979-95 it had moved up to fifth place. This offers some
reason to hope that Britain’s economic decline relative to
other European countries may have been halted, or even
reversed: though it would be easier to be sure of this if
service sector performance had improved as much as
manufacturing during the Thatcher years.
...and unemployment?
The test here is whether the Conservatives managed to
reduce the NAIRU, essentially the equilibrium level of
unemployment in the economy. Here too the record seems
to be mixed – in political terms, of course, it was often seen
as one of their greatest failures, but in economic terms the
picture is significantly less clearcut. Changes to collective
bargaining and the industrial relations structure do seem to
have had a significant impact, especially for the long run.
There is also evidence that the UK has improved its
position relative to other industrial countries. Restraint on
public spending helped, too: in the early 1990s, current
spending was around 12% lower in the UK than the
average of Western European countries – with unemploy-
ment around 2 percentage points lower than it might other-
wise have been.
Of course, there were weaknesses in the strategy
adopted. The most obvious was the failure to limit the
duration of unemployment benefits, prior to the introduc-
tion of the Jobseekers Allowance in 1996 – the economet-
ric evidence available suggests this was an important
omission. And the National Curriculum did not seem by
1995 to have reduced the problem of low British attain-
ment at the bottom end of the education system –
especially as far as mathematics is concerned.
Yet given the legacy of 1979 in terms of industrial relations,
inefficient use of labour and low skills, coupled with the
political difficulty of labour market reform, unemployment
might have been a good deal worse than it turned out to
be. The Conservatives deserve more credit that they are
usually allowed for averting that outcome.
The overall score
The long period of Conservative government left long-term
growth prospects better than would have seemed possible
in 1979; combined with a slowdown in competitor
countries, this may permit the reversal of relative economic
decline in Britain vis-à-vis Europe. The relatively low level
of equilibrium unemployment in Britain can also be seen as
a success for Conservative supply-side policies, although
continuing weaknesses in education and training have led
to the less attractive consequence of rising wage inequali-
ties. Ironically, in view of their pronouncements in 1979,
macroeconomic management was the Conservatives’
Achilles heel, with major errors responsible for excessive
economic fluctuations and the eventual loss of the govern-
ment’s reputation for economic competence; at the same
time, the record on inflation compares unfavourably with
that of other OECD countries.
While most of the governments’ macroeconomic gambles
failed miserably, microeconomic radicalism paid off
handsomely – privatisation, industrial relations reform and
the move away from the European tendency for excessive
government budgets. Even here, though, opportunities to
push this agenda more fully were missed, notably in the
areas of welfare and tax reforms. The Conservatives’ short-
term agenda was frequently only too apparent.
Lessons for New Labour?
If macroeconomic outcomes are the criteria by which the
success of economic policies are to be judged, the old
Labour approach, both in and out of government, was
seriously mistaken in many areas. The attachment to state
ownership, protectionism, high taxation, subsidies for physi-
cal investment and Keynesian demand management,
coupled with an unwillingness to accept reforms to indus-
trial relations and welfare benefits were unfortunate, as
Tony Blair and his New Labour colleagues have readily
accepted. But has the new government learnt the right
lessons from the Conservatives’ experience?
In several important aspects, actions and rhetoric so far
suggest that the answer is yes. The establishment of an
independent central bank, the lack of interest in reversing
privatisation, and continued restraint on public expenditure
are all evidence for this. The announced intention to raise
standards in education in bad state schools and to promote
the fundamental welfare reform are encouraging: but the
Conservatives discovered for themselves how difficult such
objectives were to achieve in practice.
There are some signs that New Labour have not fully
grasped the central role of incentives in improving
economic performance. But with its large majority and the
implicit acceptance that most of the supply-side reforms of
the Conservative reforms were right, the new government
could have the chance both to complete unfinished 
Tory business and raise the long-term growth rate of the 
UK economy.
Nicholas Crafts is Professor of Economic History at the LSE. 
He is a member of the CEP’s National Economic Performance
Programme. 
This is an edited version of the 1997 Wincott Lecture.
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